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The theory has been misconstrued infour primary ways, which are often expressed as the 
claims of psychological reductionism, conceptual redundancy, biological reductionism, 
and hierarchy justification. This paper addresses these claims and suggests how social 
dominance theory builds on and moves beyond social identity theory and system justifica- 
tion theory. 
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The civil and human rights reforms that swept the United States and much 
of Western Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s led many to conclude that prej- 
udice, discrimination, and oppression were well on their way to democratic res- 
olution. However, the subsequent scores of ferocious and near-genocidal 
interethnic outbreaks around the globe should convince all but the most near- 
sighted that this celebration of the triumph of tolerance was premature in the 
extreme. As a result of renewed worldwide mayhem, the 1990s witnessed a major 
resurgence of scientific nterest in the problems of prejudice, stereotyping, racism, 
and intergroup conflict. 
Both classical and contemporary work have yielded genuine insights into 
these complex and interrelated problems. Nonetheless, these insights have not 
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846 Sidanius et al. 
been able to fully explain why oppression is so widespread and tenacious. We 
suggest that part of the reason for this hole in our theoretical understanding is that 
almost all approaches have focused on some specific psychological or sociologi- 
cal cause of prejudice and discrimination. Rarely have social scientists attempted 
to understand these problems by exploring the interactions among several levels 
of analysis-that is, the manner in which psychological, sociostructural, ideolog- 
ical, and institutional forces jointly contribute o the production and reproduction 
of social oppression.' For example, modern authoritarian personality theory, aver- 
sive racism theory, and terror management theory all conceptualize prejudice and 
discrimination i terms of the individual's psychological needs or values (e.g., 
Altemeyer, 1998; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). Social identity theory, self-categorization theory, and 
much contemporary stereotyping research view these problems as ultimately 
resulting from the social construals of the self (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Such theories fail to address the main 
consequences of prejudice and discrimination (i.e., systematic group oppression 
and structural inequality), nor do they address the institutional nd ideological 
underpinnings of this oppression. That is, by focusing on strictly psychological 
motivations and social construals, most social-psychological theories fail to 
address both the context and consequences of prejudice and discrimination, 
namely group differences inpower. 
Like the psychological approaches, most structural theories also focus on a 
single root cause of prejudice and discrimination. For the most part, the structural 
theories concentrate their attention on competition over material and symbolic 
resources (e.g., Bobo, 2000; Jackman, 1994; Levine & Campbell, 1972). Despite 
the valuable insights this general approach offers with respect to some forms of 
group oppression such as racism and nationalism, it is often not able to easily 
account for other forms of group oppression such as sexism and generalized patri- 
archy (see Glick & Fiske, 1996; Jackman, 1994; Pratto & Walker, 2001; van den 
Berghe, 1967). In addition, these structural models fail to account for individual 
differences in the degree of discrimination and prejudice against "the other" 
among people who have the same structural relationships to "the other" (see also 
Huddy, 2004). 
Social dominance theory, by contrast, focuses on both individual and struc- 
tural factors that contribute to various forms of group-based oppression. The 
theory views all of the familiar forms of group-based oppression (e.g., group- 
based discrimination, racism, ethnocentrism, classism, sexism) as special cases of 
a more general tendency for humans to form and maintain group-based hierarchy. 
Rather than merely asking why people stereotype, why people are prejudiced, why 
they discriminate, orwhy they believe the world is just and fair, social dominance 
For a relatively rare partial exception, see Tilly (1998). 
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theory asks why human societies tend to be organized as group-based hierarchies. 
By framing the question in this way, social dominance theory is not simply 
focused on the extreme yet all-too-common forms of intergroup truculence (e.g., 
mass murder and genocide), as claimed by some critics (see, e.g., Huddy, 2004; 
Reicher, 2004), but rather on the universal and exquisitely subtle forms of dis- 
crimination and oppression that large numbers of people face in their everyday 
lives all over this planet. The research agenda of social dominance theory has 
included consideration of the cultural, ideological, political, and structural aspects 
of societies, leading to a focus on similarities and differences across societies, 
interactions between psychological and social-contextual processes, and the subtle 
yet important similarities and differences between various types of group-based 
oppression (e.g., arbitrary-set hierarchies vs. patriarchy).2 In specifying the cul- 
tural and gendered aspects of oppression, social dominance theory tries to avoid 
ethnocentric and androcentric overgeneralization. I  an effort o describe group- 
dominance societies as interactive systems rather than as the result of some simple 
and singular root cause (e.g., "personality"), social dominance theory explores the 
manner in which processes at different levels of analysis interact with one another. 
Finally, rather than concentrating its attention on the open-ended nature of human 
possibilities, so dear to the interests of Reicher (2004) and other advocates of the 
"blank slate" view of human nature (see Pinker, 2002), social dominance theory 
is devoted to trying to deepen our understanding of the recurrent realities of actual 
human existence, including the universal realities of patriarchy, ethnocentrism, 
and dominance/submission (see Brown, 1991; Pinker, 2002). 
Most proximally, social dominance theory notes that chronic group-based 
oppression is driven by systematic institutional nd individual discrimination. 
That is, many social institutions (e.g., schools, organized religions, marriage prac- 
tices, financial houses) and many powerful individuals disproportionately allocate 
desired goods-such as prestige, wealth, power, food, and health care-to 
members of dominant and privileged groups, while directing undesirable things- 
such as dangerous work, disdain, imprisonment, and premature death-toward 
members of less powerful groups. Because institutions allocate resources on much 
larger scales, more systematically, and more stably than individuals generally can, 
social dominance theory regards institutional discrimination as one of the major 
forces creating, maintaining, and recreating systems of group-based hierarchy. 
According to social dominance theory, group discrimination tends to be sys- 
tematic because social ideologies help to coordinate the actions of institutions and 
individuals. That is, people share knowledge and beliefs that legitimize discrim- 
ination, and most often they behave as if they endorsed these ideologies. As such, 
people support institutions that allocate resources in accordance with those ide- 
ologies (Mitchell & Sidanius, 1995; Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998; 
2 By the term "patriarchy" we refer to the pattern of male dominance in politics and the pubic sphere. 
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Pratto, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997), and, as individuals, allocate resources in 
accordance with those ideologies, particularly when they are in social contexts 
that cue these ideologies (Pratto, Tatar, & Conway-Lanz, 1999). Another conse- 
quence of societal consensus on legitimizing ideologies is that members of more 
powerful groups tend to behave in their own interest more than do members 
of less powerful groups, a phenomenon we call behavioral asymmetry (e.g., 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, chapter 9). 
Finally, the acceptance of ideologies that legitimize inequality and behaviors 
that produce inequality is partly determined by people's general desire for group- 
based dominance. This desire for group-based ominance is captured by a con- 
struct we call social dominance orientation. This psychological orientation is
important not only for understanding individual differences insociopolitical atti- 
tudes and behavior, but also for understanding group differences inbehaviors uch 
as ingroup favoritism and the attainment of social roles that influence the degree 
of hierarchy. As such, social dominance theory views the determinants ofgroup- 
based hierarchy at multiple levels of analysis, including psychological orienta- 
tions, the discriminatory behaviors of individuals, the legitimizing ideologies that 
permeate entire social systems, and the social allocations of groups and social 
institutions. 
As a relatively new set of ideas, social dominance theory has in some respects 
been poorly understood, which in turn has contributed to some confusion when 
comparing social dominance theory to other theories of intergroup relations. In 
the remainder of this essay, we address the ways in which social dominance theory 
has been misapprehended. We then compare social dominance theory to the 
related models of social identity theory and system justification theory, and con- 
clude by suggesting how our theoretical agenda can guide further research on 
stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, ideology, and intergroup relations. We 
will describe social dominance theory in richer detail as we compare the theory 
to other models and respond to the major criticisms that have been raised against 
it. 
Misconstruals of Social Dominance Theory 
There are four major ways in which social dominance theory has been mis- 
construed. These misunderstandings can be expressed as four distinct claims: the 
claim of psychological reductionism, the claim of conceptual redundancy, the 
claim of biological determinism, and the claim of hierarchy justification. 
The Claim of Psychological Reductionism 
We are in strong agreement with Reicher (2004) when he complains that the 
fate of many psychological theories is to see much of the richness and complex- 
ity of the original formulations reduced to a single aphorism and to a single 
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hypothesis. This unfortunate fate has befallen not only authoritarian personality 
theory and social identity theory, but (despite its relatively oung age) social dom- 
inance theory as well. Although a broader theoretical overview of social domi- 
nance theory was presented as early as 1993 (see Sidanius, 1993), a good deal of 
the early empirical research exploring this rather broad theory focused on the indi- 
vidual-difference construct of social dominance orientation (SDO; e.g., Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Liu, Pratto, & Shaw, 1994). This 
apparently led many to assume, mistakenly, that social dominance theory was just 
another personality theory, and as such, a model that focused solely on the role 
of this individual-difference variable in driving intergroup conflict (e.g., Schmitt, 
Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003). The role of SDO has 
become so large in the minds of some that they have come to refer to the theory 
as "social dominance orientation theory." Whereas SDO is an important compo- 
nent of the broader model, social dominance theory is neither primarily nor exclu- 
sively concerned with this individual-difference construct. Our earliest work using 
SDO addressed its relation both to institutional discrimination a d to social ide- 
ologies, which, we have always emphasized, were the two more important engines 
of group-based social hierarchy. 
Indeed, we have followed Allport's (1954) suggestion in understanding inter- 
group aggression and discrimination as the results of factors working at several 
different levels of analysis. As social dominance theory describes the process, dis- 
criminatory acts are enacted by persons with particular behavioral predispositions, 
subgroup loyalties, and social identifications, within specific social contexts, often 
in connection with the activities of social institutions and social roles, and embed- 
ded within cultures with particular social ideologies and structural relations. 
Rather than being an exercise in psychological reductionism (see Schmitt et al., 
2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003), social dominance theory is explicitly devoted 
to trying to understand how psychological predispositions, social identities, ocial 
context, social institutions, and cultural ideologies all intersect o produce and 
reproduce group-based social inequality. Rather than facilely stating that dis- 
crimination is multiply determined, research on social dominance theory has 
explored how processes at various levels of analysis intersect and reinforce one 
another, as we illustrate below. In other words, rather than merely being a "static" 
personality model, as suggested by some (e.g., Huddy, 2004; Sniderman, Crosby, 
& Howell, 2000), social dominance theory is very much a model about process, 
specifically the processes that create and recreate group-based social hierarchy. 
The issue of social context. Contrary to the claims of some critics (e.g., 
Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Reicher, 2004; Schmitt et al., 
2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003) that SDO is conceptualized as some immutable 
and static "personality" variable, and somehow apart from the "social process" 
and social structure, social dominance theorists have long argued that the sources 
of SDO are not restricted to a single set of factors (e.g., personality or the "social 
process"). Rather, SDO arises from a number of factors uch as socialization 
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experiences, situational contingencies or context, and individual temperament 
(e.g., aggression, empathy; see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, pp. 77-81). 
Social dominance theorists have paid particular attention to social context as 
a factor in SDO. Although we have shown that SDO tends to be fairly stable over 
time (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003), we have 
also argued and shown that SDO does indeed interact with particular features of 
the social context, such as the social identities primed within specific social con- 
texts and perceived social threats. For example, in a minimal-groups experiment, 
we found that people higher in SDO were most discriminatory against the out- 
group when the ingroup was one with which they could highly identify (Sidanius, 
Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). In implicit group discrimination experiments, people 
high and low in SDO appeared equally discriminatory until they were put under 
group threat, at which point high-SDO people became highly discriminatory and 
low-SDO people failed to discriminate (Pratto & Shih, 2000). Independently, 
Jackson and Esses (2000) have shown that reducing perceptions of the group 
threat posed by immigrants reduces prejudice against them by those low in SDO, 
but that this intervention does not work for those high in SDO. 
Most important, social dominance theorists have argued and shown that SDO 
levels are sensitive to both transitory and chronic differences inperceived social 
power between salient social groups. For example, we have predicted and found 
that members of dominant groups (e.g., European Americans), because of their 
privileged positions within the social hierarchy, tend to have higher levels of SDO 
than do members of subordinate groups (e.g., African Americans; see Levin, 
Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998; Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 2000; 
Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
Furthermore, as the status of one's group shifts across intergroup contexts, 
we have demonstrated that one's level of SDO shows corresponding shifts as well. 
Levin (1996) demonstrated this in a study conducted in Israel. There are three 
major ethnic status categories among Israeli Jews: Ashkenazi Jews (Jews of 
European heritage who have high status), Mizrachi Jews (Jews of Middle Eastern 
heritage who have low status), and those of mixed Ashkenazi/Mizrachi heritage 
who have intermediate status. Using respondents from all three categories, 
Levin primed Israeli Jews to think about two different group conflicts: the ethnic 
conflict between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Jews, and the national conflict between 
Jews and Palestinians. When primed to think about the ethnic conflict among 
Jews, Ashkenazi Jews showed significantly higher levels of SDO than did 
Mizrachi Jews, with mixed Jews falling in the middle. However, when primed to 
think about the conflict between Jews and Palestinians, all three Jewish groups 
showed a substantial increase in their level of SDO, and differences among the 
groups disappeared. In other words, rather than being an immutable characteris- 
tic, the degree to which one favors group-based social inequality is, in part, situ- 
ationally contingent on how one frames one's social context (see also Guimond 
et al., 2003; Levin, 2004). 
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However, the relative degree to which individuals support group-based social 
inequality also shows a reasonably high degree of cross-situational stability. For 
example, in this same study, the correlation between scores on the Social Domi- 
nance Orientation scale (henceforth "SDO scores") across these two priming con- 
texts was fairly robust, r= .56 (p < .001). In other words, people who are relatively 
high in SDO in one intergroup context also tend to be relatively high in SDO in 
another context. In contrast to the implications of Huddy (2004), one of the things 
implied by this finding is that even after one is able to control for a wide variety 
of the situational, occupational, and socialization factors thought to contribute o 
SDO, we should still expect to find reliable individual differences inSDO, largely 
attributable totemperamental or personality factors. Again, this reasoning under- 
scores the need to understand the individual's support for group-based social hier- 
archy as multidetermined and as a function of factors operating on several 
different levels of analysis. 
The issue of social institutions. Another implication of the psychological 
reductionism charge is the misapprehension that social dominance theory empha- 
sizes the role of psychological predispositions at the expense of addressing the role 
of social institutions inthe production and maintenance of discrimination. I  point 
of fact, almost singularly among social-psychological theories (see also Jones, 
1997), social dominance theory emphasizes that social institutions are centrally 
implicated in the establishment and maintenance of group-based social inequality 
and intergroup discrimination (see, e.g., Mitchell & Sidanius, 1995; Pratto, 
Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997; Sidanius, Liu, et al., 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, 
Sinclair, & van Laar, 1996; van Laar, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Sinclair, 1999). 
Indeed, our review of research on institutional discrimination (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999, chapters 5-8) found that institutional discrimination is pervasive across a 
wide range of societies and domains of life, encompassing housing, labor, health 
care, retail, education, and law. The greater the institutional discrimination within 
a given society, the steeper the level of social hierarchy we would expect to find. 
Although many powerful institutions-including major financial organiza- 
tions (e.g., banks, investment houses, insurance companies) and major sectors of 
the criminal justice system (e.g., police, secret police, prosecutors, judges, prison 
administrators)-allocate r sources in ways that create and maintain group dom- 
inance, social dominance theory has also identified a class of institutions that 
attenuate rather than enhance group-based hierarchy. Institutions that dispropor- 
tionately allocate resources for the benefit of subordinates-such as civil and 
human rights organizations, public and private welfare agencies, and the public 
defender's office-are labeled as hierarchy-attenuating. Social dominance theory 
postulates that the stability of group-based social hierarchy is, in part, a function 
of the equilibrium created by the counterbalancing effects of these hierarchy- 
enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating social institutions. 
The intersection between individual behavioral predispositions and social 
roles. By considering the assignment of individuals into hierarchy-enhancing a d
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hierarchy-attenuating social roles and institutions, social dominance theory has 
addressed some of the ways that social ideologies, social context, and individu- 
als' psychological proclivities contribute to institutional discrimination. The 
theory hypothesizes that the functioning of hierarchy-enhancing a d hierarchy- 
attenuating institutions will be aided when they are staffed by personnel with the 
values, attitudes, and behavioral predispositions that are consistent with the insti- 
tution's character. Specifically, personnel in hierarchy-enhancing i stitutions 
should tend to be relatively anti-egalitarian, whereas personnel in hierarchy- 
attenuating institutions should be relatively egalitarian in their views of the desired 
relationship among social groups. In other words, individuals' desires for group- 
based inequality and dominance should be compatible with their institutional 
roles. 
In one test of this hypothesis, Sidanius, Liu et al. (1994) compared the SDO 
scores of people in four different institutional roles-police officers in the Los 
Angeles Police Department (a hierarchy-enhancing role), public defenders from 
the Los Angeles County public defender's office (a hierarchy-attenuating role), 
UCLA students (people with mixed intentions regarding their future roles), and 
adults called to jury duty in Los Angeles County (people with mixed current hier- 
archy roles)-both before and after controlling for a number of demographic 
factors (e.g., "race," age, gender, social class, education). Because of their dif- 
ferent hierarchy roles, police officers were expected to have higher SDO scores 
and public defenders lower SDO scores than students and jurors. These expecta- 
tions were confirmed, even after controlling for demographic differences between 
the groups. Police officers were found to be significantly more social domi- 
nance-oriented than both students and jurors (who represented a random sample 
of Los Angeles citizens), whereas public defenders were found to be significantly 
less social dominance-oriented than both students and jurors. Pratto, Stallworth, 
Sidanius, and Siers (1997) later found that voters classified into hierarchy roles 
on the basis of their current or most recent occupations (for retirees) showed 
similar differences inSDO scores (see also Dambrun, Guimond, & Duarte, 2002; 
Guimond, 2000; Guimond & Palmer, 1996). 
Sorting individuals into compatible social roles. Because people's values 
regarding roup-based equality will be important for the smooth functioning of 
the social institutions inwhich they are situated and the social roles they are to 
perform, social dominance theory expects several processes to assort individuals 
into compatible social roles. To date, some evidence has been provided for five 
assortment processes: self-selection, institutional selection, institutional social- 
ization, differential reward, and differential attrition. 
Self-selection. Social dominance theory suggests that when individuals are 
given a choice, they will tend to choose social roles compatible with their SDO 
levels. This effect was first demonstrated by Sidanius et al. (1996) using two 
samples of UCLA students. The students rated the attractiveness offour hierar- 
chy-enhancing careers (i.e., government prosecutor, law enforcement officer, FBI 
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agent, big business person) and four hierarchy-attenuating careers (i.e., civil rights 
lawyer, lawyer for the poor, human rights advocate, and working for the benefit 
of disadvantaged groups). Even controlling for socioeconomic status and politi- 
cal conservatism, SDO was positively associated with the perceived attractive- 
ness of hierarchy-enhancing careers and negatively associated with the perceived 
attractiveness ofhierarchy-attenuating careers. Similarly, when Stanford Univer- 
sity students were asked to choose between hierarchy-attenuating and hierarchy- 
enhancing jobs, their choices reflected their SDO levels (Pratto, Stallworth, 
Sidanius, & Siers, 1997, experiments 1 and 2). Together, these results provide 
support for the idea that people will self-select into "appropriate" hierarchy- 
enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating social roles, depending on their orientation 
toward group-based inequality (see also Sidanius et al., 2003). 
Institutional selection. Institutions are also expected to select personnel with 
values compatible with the institution's hierarchy function. Pratto, Stallworth, 
Sidanius, and Siers (1997, experiments 3 and 4) found evidence for institutional 
selection in simulated employment experiments. University students assumed the 
role of employers in a position to influence hiring decisions. In both experiments, 
participants were given a set of job descriptions, half of which were hierarchy- 
enhancing and half of which were hierarchy-attenuating. Although the descrip- 
tions varied according to whether the job was hierarchy-enhancing or 
hierarchy-attenuating, the duties, salary, and title for each job within an occupa- 
tion were equivalent. Next, the respondents were given resum6s of job candidates, 
which controlled for their qualifications but varied with respect to the hierarchy 
role experience of the candidate. For example, one candidate was described as 
having been a camp counselor at a selective private camp for elite young men and 
women in Lake Tahoe and as co-founder and president of "Capital Operations," 
a student club promoting free enterprise in Eastern Europe and Russia. In another 
rendition, this applicant was described as having been a camp counselor for a 
Head Start program in San Francisco and as co-founder and president of "Life 
Savers," a student club promoting international legislation to protect rainforests 
and their inhabitants. Pretests confirmed that people inferred that these applicants 
had high and low SDO levels, respectively. Simulated employers hired more 
apparently low-SDO candidates into hierarchy-attenuating jobs and hired more 
apparently high-SDO candidates into hierarchy-enhancing jobs. They also hired 
more women into hierarchy-attenuating jobs and more men into hierarchy- 
enhancing jobs. Because men have higher average SDO levels than women (Pratto 
et al., 2000; Sidanius et al., 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & 
Bobo, 1994; see also Sidanius, Pratto, & Brief, 1995), this bias would also assort 
more high-SDO people into hierarchy-enhancing roles and more low-SDO people 
into hierarchy-attenuating roles. Likewise, when choosing among white, black, 
and Hispanic job applicants for these roles, people preferred to hire white appli- 
cants for hierarchy-enhancing roles and especially preferred to hire black and 
Hispanic job applicants for hierarchy-attenuating roles (Pratto & Espinoza, 
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2001). This race bias also contributes to compatibility between employees' SDO 
levels and the roles for which they are selected because of racial differences in 
SDO levels (Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994). 
Institutional socialization. Another process leading to compatibility between 
individuals' discriminatory predispositions and their roles within social institu- 
tions is institutional socialization. Formal institutional rules, peer pressure, insti- 
tutional incentives, dissonance reduction processes, and other subtle and direct 
pressures may all induce people to adopt the values, beliefs, and attitudes com- 
patible with the social roles they occupy. For example, Teahan (1975a) examined 
the racial attitudes of 97 white police officers upon entry into the police academy 
and over the next 18 months. As the officers progressed through their police train- 
ing, their racial attitudes became progressively more hostile toward blacks. In a 
separate study designed to examine the effects of role-playing experiences on the 
attenuation of racial hostility, Teahan (1975b) found that role-playing increased 
racial hostility toward blacks among white officers, whereas it decreased racial 
hostility toward whites among black police officers. In essence, socialization for 
the hierarchy-enhancing role of police officer led members of dominant groups to 
hold more hostile attitudes toward subordinates, and led members of subordinate 
groups to develop more obsequious attitudes toward dominants. Similarly, 
Dambrun et al. (2002) examined how the impact of "hierarchy-enhancing vs. 
attenuating" academic majors related to racial stereotypes of French Arabs, SDO, 
and perceived social norms regarding tolerance in samples of psychology students 
(hierarchy-enhancing majors) and law students (hierarchy-attenuating majors) 
from a French university. Relative to law students, psychology students were 
found to have lower levels of anti-Arab stereotyping and SDO as well as higher 
support for tolerance norms (see also Guimond, 2000). 
A major study of political socialization shows similar evidence of the differ- 
ential effects of socializing environments on dominants and subordinates. In a 
little-noted finding from a large panel study of American high school students, 
"good citizenship" attitudes were studied as a function of the number of civics 
courses taken among white and black high school students (Jennings & Niemi, 
1974). Being a "good citizen" could be defined either as political participation 
(e.g., voting, running for political office) or as showing obedience and loyalty to 
leaders and political institutions. Consistent with normative democratic theory, 
Jennings and Niemi (1974) found that he more civics courses white students took 
in high school, the more likely they defined "good citizenship" in terms of par- 
ticipation rather than as loyalty to political authority. However, the opposite trend 
was found among black students. The more civics courses black students took, 
the more they defined "good citizenship" as loyalty to authority rather than as 
political participation. This trend was especially pronounced among black stu- 
dents with well-educated parents. 
Although these results are at odds with normative democratic theory, they are 
very consistent with the general spirit of social dominance theory. Together, these 
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results suggest that not only will social institutions socialize people to function 
effectively within the social roles assigned to them, these socialization effects are 
also likely to be qualitatively different depending on whether a person is a member 
of a dominant or subordinate social group. If institutional socialization encour- 
ages children and adults from dominant groups to participate in the political 
process and to hold dominant racial attitudes while encouraging those from sub- 
ordinate groups to display political obedience and submission to dominants, uch 
socialization should lead to the continued authority of dominants and political 
passivity of subordinates. Because of these differential socialization effects, the 
American secondary school system would have to be classified as hierarchy- 
enhancing. 
In contrast, there is some evidence that American higher education has 
hierarchy-attenuating effects. Cross-sectional nd longitudinal studies show that 
prejudice against subordinates usually decreases with increased higher education 
(e.g., Bobo & Licari, 1989; Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991).3 For 
example, Sinclair, Sidanius, and Levin (1998) examined social attitudes and racial 
policy preferences among 1,623 students at UCLA just before their enrollment 
and upon completion of their freshman year. After 9 months of exposure to the 
university environment, s udents became reliably less group dominance-oriented, 
less convinced of the inevitable conflict between racial groups, less racist, less 
opposed to the egalitarian distribution of social resources, and less opposed to 
welfare for the poor. 
Differential reward. If institutions are interested in ensuring that their per- 
sonnel display role-appropriate b havior, one should expect them to reward 
behavior compatible with their social roles and to punish behavior incompatible 
with those roles. For example, personnel in hierarchy-enhancing roles should 
enjoy institutional rewards for displaying aggressive, demeaning, or oppressive 
attitudes toward members of subordinate groups, at least so long as these oppres- 
sive behaviors do not too obviously violate broadly accepted norms of "fairness 
and justice." Consistent with this idea, Leitner and Sedlacek (1976) found that 
campus police officers with higher racial prejudice scores were more likely to 
receive positive performance evaluations from their supervisors, even after con- 
trolling for a number of other factors. Similarly, in a comprehensive investigation 
of the Los Angeles Police Department following the infamous Rodney King police 
brutality case, personnel files of the 44 officers with the highest number of civil- 
ian complaints for brutality, use of excessive force, and improper tactics revealed 
that their supervisors had favorable impressions of them and were unusually opti- 
mistic about their future prospects on the police force (Christopher et al., 1991). 
Together, these findings suggest that race-targeted cases of police brutality (e.g., 
the torture of Abner Louima; the police shootings of Amadou Diallo, Patrick 
For exceptions and nuances to this general trend, see Jackman (1981), Jackman and Muha (1984), 
Weil (1985), and Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996). 
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Doresmond, and others) and "racial profiling" are not really examples of "a few 
bad apples" on the police force, but rather represent extreme examples of a more 
general pattern in which the police force enacts its hierarchy-enhancing function 
by behaving in an especially intimidating fashion toward members of subordinate 
groups. The fact that ethnic subordinates (i.e., blacks and Latinos) experience 
more fear of the police than do ethnic dominants (i.e., European Americans) 
also indicates that the hierarchy-enhancing and differentially threatening 
character of the police force is being communicated (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, 
pp. 220-223). 
We have found evidence for differential rewards for role-appropriate group 
dominance attitudes in other organizations as well. For example, van Laar et al. 
(1999) examined the grades given to university students as a function of how well 
their racial attitudes fit their academic major. On the basis of academic major, 
5,655 students at the University of Texas at Austin were classified into one of 
three categories: hierarchy-enhancers, hierarchy-attenuators, or "neutrals." As 
expected, hierarchy-enhancers had reliably higher racism scores than neutrals, and 
hierarchy-attenuators had reliably lower racism scores than neutrals. Next, stu- 
dents were classified as either "congruents" or "incongruents" depending on the 
precise configuration of their racial attitudes and their college majors. Students 
were classified as congruents if they had racism scores in the top third of the dis- 
tribution and had hierarchy-enhancing college majors, or if they had racism scores 
in the bottom third of the distribution and had hierarchy-attenuating college 
majors. Students were classified as incongruents if they had racism scores in the 
top third of the distribution a d had hierarchy-attenuating college majors, or if 
they had racism scores in the bottom third of the distribution a d had hierarchy- 
enhancing college majors. 
One of the major kinds of institutional feedback provided to college students 
is course grades; all else being equal, we therefore expected congruents to enjoy 
relatively higher grade-point averages than incongruents. This predicted interac- 
tive pattern was supported by the data. The majority of students with incongru- 
ent attitudes received less than a C average, whereas the majority of students with 
congruent attitudes received above a C average. This pattern held even after con- 
trolling for racism, college major, ethnicity, political conservatism, and year in 
school. If this result generalizes, it would indicate that, all else being equal, people 
are rewarded when displaying attitudes toward group-based social hierarchy that 
are compatible with their social roles and are punished for displaying attitudes 
that are incongruent with these social roles (see also Sidanius et al., 2003). 
Differential attrition. Given that people may be differentially rewarded or 
punished for holding role-compatible or role-incompatible group dominance atti- 
tudes, we also expect differential attrition from social roles among congruents and 
incongruents. People with incompatible attitudes toward group dominance (i.e., 
incongruents) hould leave their hierarchy roles at higher ates than people with 
compatible attitudes (i.e., congruents). Because high grades were likely to be 
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differentially given to students with a good match between their racial attitudes 
and their chosen college majors, van Laar et al. (1999) expected that there should 
be evidence of an increasing match between students' racial prejudice scores and 
their chosen majors as students progress through the university. Again, the data 
were consistent with expectations. Among freshmen, incongruents tended to be 
significantly overrepresented, whereas congruents tended to be significantly 
underrepresented. However, among juniors, the opposite trend was found. This 
increasing match between students' racial attitudes and their college majors held 
even when controlling for other factors (e.g., gender, ethnicity, political ideology). 
This increasing match can be accounted for by at least two processes: greater attri- 
tion of incongruents from inconsistent majors, or institutional socialization 
leading students to change their racial attitudes toward greater congruence. 
Overall, this evidence for the assortment of individuals into compatible social 
roles shows that, over time and given appropriate feedback, people are self- and 
institutionally selected, socialized, and rewarded such that their orientations 
toward group dominance fit with their surrounding institutional contexts. 
In sum, rather than being an exercise in psychological reductionism, social 
dominance theory argues that group-based social hierarchy and its attendant man- 
ifestations (e.g., prejudice and discrimination) are the results of the interactions 
among phenomena at several different levels of analysis. Among these processes 
are the interactions between the individual's ideological predispositions and the 
individual's immediate social contexts, including the contexts created by social 
institutions. 
The Claim of Conceptual Redundancy 
Social dominance theory has also been criticized for merely renaming 
familiar constructs such as authoritarianism and political conservatism with new 
labels such as social dominance orientation (J. Citrin, personal communication, 
November 1997; Turner, 1999). 
Social dominance orientation versus authoritarianism. One of the several 
major contributions that authoritarian personality theory made to the literature on 
intergroup relations was the observation that people who are prejudiced against 
one group are also likely to be prejudiced against other groups. This generalized 
ethnocentric predisposition was not merely an isolated attitude toward outgroups, 
but was found to be part of a larger syndrome of personality characteristics and 
sociopolitical beliefs consisting of components such as political conservatism, 
pseudo-patriotism, and religiosity. This complex of personality and sociopolitical 
beliefs was labeled the authoritarian character (see Fromm, 1941). 
Like authoritarian personality theory, social dominance theory assumes that 
people's ethnocentric orientations and sociopolitical attitudes are reflections of, 
and are rooted in, personality and cross-situationally consistent behavioral pre- 
dispositions. However, despite this commonality, the specific etiologies and foci 
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of authoritarianism and SDO are assumed to be qualitatively different. First, 
authoritarianism is regarded as a pathological state of mind and a complex set of 
ego-defensive mechanisms designed to protect the individual from feelings of 
inadequacy and almost existential anxiety, all resulting from oppressive and 
highly conditional parent-child interactions (see Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948). Whereas social dominance 
theory lacks a detailed etiological explanation for the development of SDO, rather 
than being regarded as a pathological condition, SDO is a dimension thought to 
reflect normal human variation and to be influenced by a combination of social- 
ization experiences, contextually sensitive material and symbolic interests (e.g., 
high social status), and dispositional differences infactors uch as aggression and 
lack of empathy. 
Second, modern conceptualizations of authoritarianism largely focus on the 
individual's relationship to the ingroup, including the individual's proclivity to 
submit to ingroup authority, display ingroup-sanctioned aggressiveness toward 
individuals, and adhere to ingroup norms (i.e., conventionalism). In contrast, SDO 
focuses entirely on attitudes toward hierarchical relationships between groups and 
the desire to promote intergroup domination.4 
Third, although both SDO and authoritarianism areindividual-difference con- 
structs, the construct of SDO is embedded within a much larger and multilevel 
theory of intergroup relations. In contrast, authoritarian personality theory really 
is a strict personality theory of prejudice and focuses almost all of its attention on 
intrapsychic mechanics. Consequently, whereas most research stemming from 
authoritarian personality theory paid almost no attention to the role of cultural or 
ideological context (see Pettigrew, 1958), the role of cultural and ideological 
context has been central to social dominance theory's understanding of how dis- 
criminatory practices are justified and rationalized (see, e.g., Pratto, 1999; Pratto 
et al., 2000; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999). 
Not only are authoritarianism and SDO conceptually distinct, but a consis- 
tent line of research shows these two constructs o be empirically distinct as well. 
For example, whereas both modem scales of authoritarianism (e.g., right-wing 
authoritarianism) and SDO have been found to be strong predictors of prejudice 
against generalized outgroups (women, blacks, gays, foreigners, prisoners, etc.), 
they make quite independent contributions to the prediction of these attitudes 
while being largely independent of each other (see Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 
4 Whereas the earliest conceptualizations of SDO defined it as expressing the desire for ingroup dom- 
ination over outgroups (e.g., Sidanius, 1993), the definition has been modified to reflect a more 
general desire for hierarchical relationships among social groups (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This 
also implies that, in the terms of system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2001), 
SDO should be conceived as "system-justifying" rather than "group-justifying," although for 
members of dominant groups, SDO is both system- and group-justifying. 
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2003; Jackson & Esses, 2000; McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Pratto et al., 1994; 
Whitley, 1999; Whitley & Aegisdottir, 2000; for a detailed discussion, see 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
Social dominance orientation versus political conservatism. Some scholars 
have also claimed that SDO is simply another term for political conservatism (e.g., 
J. Citrin, personal communication, November 1997). Of course, the degree to 
which one views these two constructs a overlapping depends on how one chooses 
to define "political conservatism." Of the 13 definitions of conservatism discussed 
by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), there is one that bears some conceptual similarity 
to SDO. Edmund Burke (1790/1955), widely known as "the father of conser- 
vatism," defined political conservatism, among other ways, as opposition to social 
leveling and support for the rule of "social superiors" over "social inferiors." In 
Burke's day, this meant continued support for the political dominance of Euro- 
pean aristocracy and opposition to political democracy and universal suffrage. 
However, few if any contemporary conservatives would be willing to endorse this 
definition as representing core or even peripheral ideas within modern conser- 
vatism. Rather, contemporary conservatives tend to define political conservatism 
as some admixture of respect for the integrity of "individual freedom," belief in 
the importance of maintaining established values and institutions, opposition to 
government interference inthe economy, and the sanctity of private property (see 
Buckley & Kesler, 1988). Some conservatives even claim that conservatism is
centrally concerned with support for equality of opportunity as opposed to equal- 
ity of result (e.g., Connerly, 1997). Thus, not only are modem political conser- 
vatism and SDO conceptually distinct, but previous research shows that they are 
empirically distinguishable as well (see, e.g., Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, 
& Bobo, 1994). For example, across 15 independent American samples, Sidanius 
and Pratto (1999) found that the median correlation between political conser- 
vatism and SDO was about .28, an association much too low to indicate concep- 
tual redundancy. 
The Claim of Biological Determinism 
Another criticism of social dominance theory is that it is just an exercise in 
biological determinism (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Turner & Reynolds, 2003; 
Ward, 1995). At its heart, the thesis of biological determinism assumes that much 
of human behavior is a function of the autonomous actions of genes rather than 
environmental orcultural factors. Thus, within the conceptual framework of bio- 
logical determinism, it is quite reasonable to go in search of such things as "the 
gene for" alcoholism, schizophrenia, intelligence, or aggression. Although this 
simplistic "geneticism" did indeed characterize most Darwinian and evolutionary 
thought of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this type of biological deter- 
minism does not represent he thinking of modern evolutionary psychology in 
general, nor of social dominance theory. 
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Furthermore, ather than regarding "cultural" and "biological" factors as sov- 
ereign and competing sources of human behavior, modern evolutionary psychol- 
ogy theory (and social dominance theory) regard both "nature" and "nurture" as 
mutually dependent and continuously interacting sources of human action (see, 
e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wrangham & Peterson, 
1996). It is now broadly recognized that the manner in which a given genotype 
expresses itself as a phenotype is very strongly dependent on environmental and 
contextual factors. Because "evolved predispositions" and "cultural phenomena" 
are mutually interdependent, the duality implied by the "nature versus nurture" 
framing is both misleading and intellectually sterile. What we consider "culture" 
may be attributable to the aggregated and highly interactive action of genes 
expressed within specific environmental contexts, and the continued evolution of 
genetic predispositions takes place within the selection environments created, in 
part, by "culture." Instead of falling into the theoretical black hole of the "nature 
versus nature" fallacy,5 together with other evolutionary psychologists, social 
dominance theorists have strongly argued that social behavior must be seen as the 
result of a complex and mutually endogenous interaction between "genetic" and 
"social" factors (Caporael & Brewer, 1991; Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992; 
Sidanius & Kurzban, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Even more profoundly, 
we have argued that he mutual endogeneity of these "genetic" and "social" factors 
is so fundamental and so powerful that it is essentially meaningless and quite mis- 
leading to even try to separate one set of factors from the other, or to speak in 
terms of the percentages of behavior due to either "genetic" or "environmental" 
factors. In addition, unlike some evolutionary theorists who argue that the forces 
of natural selection are strictly located at the genetic level (see, e.g., Dawkins, 
1989), in agreement with Sober and Wilson (1998), we suggest that it is much 
more reasonable to think of the forces of natural selection as operating at several 
different levels simultaneously, including the genetic, the organismic, and the 
level of social norms and forms of social organization (see also Gould, 2001). In 
short, we should regard human action as the result of an enormously complex 
interaction between an array of weakly determinative factors, including enotype, 
specific environmental conditions at multiple levels of organization (e.g., inter- 
cellular, interpersonal, intergroup, etc.), and pure chance. This multilevel and 
inherently interactionist perspective is a far cry from the simplistic genetic deter- 
minism of the past, or "pallid interactionism" in which psychological predisposi- 
tions dominate and distinctly social factors are treated merely as epiphenomena 
(see Reicher, 2004). 
The accusation of biological determinism ay in part be generated because, 
in emphasizing the ubiquity of group-based dominance in human societies and 
5 The "nature versus nurture" question is also referred to as "Galton's error" (see Wrangham & 
Peterson, 1996). 
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the instability of egalitarian societies, we have written about the seeming 
"inevitability" of group dominance (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). Although it is 
not the place of scientific theories to predict the future, we have emphasized the 
ubiquity and stability of group-based inequality precisely because so many of our 
colleagues insist that "democratic" societies such as the United States, Canada, 
and Germany are so fundamentally different from empires, dictatorships, monar- 
chies, and other group-based dominance hierarchies. Despite some obvious dif- 
ferences between "democratic" and "nondemocratic" societies, blindness to the 
underlying similarities among these societies leads many social scientists to triv- 
ialize the suffering of subordinates, tounderestimate he stability of group-based 
inequality, and to ignore many of the subtle and converging social forces that con- 
tribute to the stability of this hierarchy (e.g., Blossfeld & Shavit, 1993). Simply 
put, scientists cannot be expected to theorize about inequality if they do not first 
admit its existence and examine its form. 
The accusation of biological determinism ay also have been aimed at social 
dominance theory because social dominance theory argues that the political 
psychology of gender is qualitatively different from the political psychology of 
"arbitrary sets" (e.g., differences between social classes, ethnic groups, tribes, or 
nations; see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, chapter 10). Research on social dominance 
theory has found small and rather context-invariant male/female differences in 
SDO and associated political and social attitudes (Levin, 2004; Pratto, Sidanius, 
& Stallworth, 1993; Sidanius, Cling, & Pratto, 1991; Sidanius et al., 2000; 
Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). We have interpreted these male/female differ- 
ences as partly determined by the long-range male/female differences in mating 
strategies. However, even if one accepts the notion of certain predispositional dif- 
ferences between males and females with respect to intergroup aggression and 
group-based hierarchy, in contrast o the implications of Huddy (2004), this does 
not imply a deterministic relationship between gender and SDO. Rather, just as 
with male/female differences inheight, this sex difference isprobabilistic rather 
than deterministic. This is to say that even though males are taller than females 
on average, and even though this difference most likely has a substantial evolu- 
tionary component, there are still a substantial number of women who are taller 
than the average male. 
Moreover, this evolutionary interpretation of the average male/female differ- 
ence in group dominance orientation does not necessarily imply that one is also 
endorsing the notion of the autonomous and sovereign action of "genes" and 
thereby falling prey to the "nature versus nature" fallacy. Rather, to the extent hat 
there are robust and situationally stable male/female differences in intergroup 
aggression and social dominance, these differences should also be seen as the 
result of complex interactions between genotypes and social and cultural envi- 
ronments unfolding over broad swaths of evolutionary time. 
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The Claim of Hierarchy Justification 
Finally, because social dominance theory is centrally concerned with the 
resilience and ubiquity of group-based social hierarchy, some critics have accused 
the theory of providing moral and intellectual legitimacy for continued social 
inequality (e.g., Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001). Ironically, we have repeatedly 
spoken out against the misuse of scientific theorizing as an ideological justifica- 
tion for gender and race inequality (Pratto, 1996, 1999; Pratto & Hegarty, 2000; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, chapter 11). To conflate evolutionarily informed descrip- 
tions of human behavior with morally proscriptive statements i to commit the 
naturalistic fallacy. Whereas the naturalistic fallacy was a central feature of the 
notorious distortions of evolutionary theory represented by scholars such as 
Edmund Spencer and his followers (commonly misnamed "social Darwinism"), 
this idea is not only rejected by most contemporary evolutionary theorists, but 
was also definitely rejected by Charles Darwin himself. For example, in a letter 
to a good friend, Charles Lyell, Darwin wrote: "I have noted in a Manchester 
newspaper a rather good squib, showing that I have proved that 'might is right' 
and therefore Napoleon is right and every cheating tradesman is also right" 
(Rachels, 1990). Following G. E. Moore's arguments of almost 100 years ago (see 
Wright, 1995), evolutionarily informed analysis of human behavior is no more a 
moral endorsement of that behavior than geology is a moral endorsement of earth- 
quakes, epidemiology a moral endorsement of Ebola outbreaks, or psychiatry an 
endorsement of madness. 
With optimism that is unanticipated by its critics, and following Marxist and 
feminist thinking rather than Spencerian fallacies, social dominance theory has 
highlighted the problem of group-based inequality as a starting point to seeing the 
problem addressed. Rather than being an endorsement of oppression, social dom- 
inance theory can be seen as a prerequisite to morally driven intervention. That 
is, when the processes producing and maintaining roup-based social hierarchy 
are acknowledged and well understood, moral beings can then make informed 
decisions about how to modify these processes and make them more consistent 
with their values, whatever those values may be. Whereas hierarchy-enhancers 
could certainly use our research to further their goals, they are not the ones most 
in need of help from science to accomplish their goals. Indeed, human history 
shows that tyrannical and ferociously hierarchical social systems are all too easy 
to establish and maintain. In contrast, complex social systems even approaching 
"democratic" and egalitarian ideals appear to be horribly difficult toestablish and 
are only maintained with great difficulty and near-constant vigilance (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999, chapter 1). Basing social action on unrealistic and false assumptions 
about human nature will not only fail to bring us any closer to the elimination of 
group-based oppression, it will also make this task seem more intractable than it 
really is. Rather, because we would like to see societies with democratic ideals 
actually realize these goals, it is critical that hierarchy-attenuators appreciate how 
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social hierarchies actually function rather than allow their analyses to be com- 
promised and distorted by how they would prefer social hierarchies to function. 
Similarities and Differences Among Social Dominance Theory, System 
Justification Theory, and Social Identity Theory 
Social Identity Theory 
As one of social psychology's major contemporary theories, social identity 
theory and its derivatives have deeply inspired and influenced the development 
of social dominance theory (see Sidanius, 1993). In particular, social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) emphasizes the dynamic ways in 
which people can construct their social identities to suit their needs. This flexi- 
bility influenced us to conceptualize the group distinctions based on race, nation- 
ality, class, ethnicity, and religion as "arbitrary-set" distinctions, because we note 
similarities in how they function, regardless of the particular histories and local 
ideologies on which they are based. Another influence derives from social iden- 
tity theory's urprising but robust finding of ingroup favoritism in minimally 
defined groups-that is, groups in name only-even when these "groups" have 
no prior history, no actual interaction, and no material stakes (see Mullen, Brown, 
& Smith, 1992). Although the exact meaning of this phenomenon is still in 
dispute, it suggests to us that, besides paying attention to the sociostructural sit- 
uations in which people live, we must also consider the possibility that people 
have a predisposition to form situationally contingent ingroup/outgroup distinc- 
tions and to discriminate on the basis of these boundaries. Finally, social identity 
theory is one of the most elegant social-psychological theories there is, describ- 
ing in detail how people's psychological motivations (e.g., desire for positive 
regard) interact with their understandings of their social situation (e.g., whether 
group boundaries are stable or legitimate) to influence intergroup attitudes and 
behaviors. 
Partly because of the many expansions of social identity theory and partly 
because of our own theoretical agenda, social dominance theory also differs sub- 
stantially from social identity theory. As primarily a psychological theory, social 
identity theory posits that intergroup discrimination is motivated by the desire to 
achieve positive group distinctiveness for the purpose of enhancing individual 
self-esteem. However, there are three problems with this tenet. First, numerous 
studies show that self-esteem is not as consistently implicated in intergroup dis- 
crimination as social identity theory assumes. Specifically, it is unclear whether 
intergroup discrimination is a cause of enhanced self-esteem or a result of low 
self-esteem (see, e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Rubin & 
Hewstone, 1998). Second, whereas the desire for positive distinctiveness may 
explain ingroup favoritism (e.g., Brewer, 1979), it strains credibility to assume 
that it can also explain extreme forms of outgroup denigration such as hate crimes, 
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mass murder, or genocide (e.g., Mummendey, 1995) or discrimination by institu- 
tions. Indeed, institutional discrimination, arguably that form of discrimination 
having the greatest impact on people's lives, has been almost completely neg- 
lected by social identity theory. Third, social identity theory expects people to 
evaluate their ingroups more favorably on dimensions that are directly tied to dif- 
ferences in group status (Mullen et al., 1992; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991). 
However, outgroup favoritism is not uncommon (Hinkle & Brown, 1990), even 
among members of low-status groups, who presumably have the greatest need for 
positive identity (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1947; Gopaul-McNichol, 1988; Powell- 
Hopson & Hopson, 1992). 
Social dominance theory has attempted to resolve some of the dilemmas in 
social identity research by paying more attention to the real social and asymmet- 
rical context in which intergroup behavior takes place. Specifically, social domi- 
nance theory emphasizes that the means of achieving legitimacy, prestige, and a 
sense of belonging differ for members of dominant and subordinate groups 
because they are not equally legitimized by cultural ideologies and because they 
hold different amounts of power (see also some important work on social iden- 
tity and social context by Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; 
Ellemers, Barreto, & Spears, 1999; Smith, Spears, & Hamstra, 1999; Spears, 
Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999; Wigbolus, Spears, & Semin, 1999). For example, 
social dominance theory predicts that endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing ide- 
ologies and greater SDO will increase ingroup favoritism among dominant groups 
but will decrease ingroup favoritism.among subordinate groups. When subordi- 
nates endorse hierarchy-enhancing ideologies to an extreme degree, they will not 
only fail to exhibit ingroup favoritism but will actually show outgroup favoritism, 
even on very general evaluative dimensions (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, chapter 
9). The notion that legitimizing ideologies will be differentially related to ingroup 
favoritism and ingroup identities among members of dominant and subordinate 
groups is known as the asymmetry hypothesis, and is an example of social dom- 
inance theory's agenda of examining asymmetries between the situations of dom- 
inant and subordinate groups.6 
Group asymmetries also explain why ingroup identification is not consistently 
associated with ingroup favoritism, contrary to predictions from social identity 
theory (Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Ingroup identification can serve both positive 
functions in promoting positive identity and negative functions in promoting intol- 
erance and discrimination. Thus, as a descriptor of one's goals vis-a-vis groups, 
SDO is an important moderator of the relationship between ingroup identification 
and ingroup bias. For example, Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell (1994) found that 
individuals with strong ingroup identification a d high SDO exhibited the most 
ingroup bias, whereas Levin (1992) found that subordinate group members with 
6 Contrary to the claims of Turner and Reynolds (2003), the asymmetry hypothesis does not claim 
that subordinates will always display outgroup favoritism. 
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low ingroup identification and high SDO maximally favored the outgroup. 
Further, the direction of the association between ingroup identification a d SDO 
also depends on group power. Individuals who favor group-based inequality 
should tend to identify more strongly with dominant ingroups because their 
members have greater access to resources (e.g., political power) that can be used 
to maintain social hierarchy. However, the situation of high-SDO individuals 
within subordinate groups is more problematic. Because desire for group-based 
inequality emphasizes the inferiority of subordinate groups, high-SDO individu- 
als from low-status groups should disidentify with subordinate ingroups. High 
levels of SDO should thus be associated with increased ingroup identification 
among dominants and decreased ingroup identification among subordinates. 
Consistent with these expectations, Sidanius, Pratto, and Rabinowitz (1994) found 
that SDO was associated with increased ingroup salience and identification 
among whites but decreased ingroup salience and identification among Latino and 
African Americans. Similarly, in a study comparing whites and Latinos in the 
United States, Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Jews in Israel, and Israeli Jews and Arabs, 
Levin and Sidanius (1999) found that SDO was positively related to ingroup iden- 
tification among all dominant groups (white Americans, Ashkenazi Jews, and 
Jews, respectively) but negatively related to ingroup identification among subor- 
dinate groups (Latinos, Mizrachi Jews, and Israeli Arabs). This study also indi- 
cated that SDO and ingroup identification have differential effects on ingroup and 
outgroup affect among members of high- and low-status groups. Specifically, 
whereas ingroup identification was positively associated with ingroup affect 
among all groups, SDO was associated with more negative affect oward low- 
status groups, regardless of one's own group membership. Therefore, ven if the 
ingroup identification processes emphasized by social identity theory can explain 
ingroup favoritism under certain conditions (see Hinkle & Brown, 1990), the 
desires for social dominance emphasized by social dominance theory may be able 
to better explain the derogation of low-status groups among members of both 
high- and low-status groups. 
A further distinction between the two theories is that unlike social identity 
theory, social dominance theory emphasizes the distinction between social status 
and social power. Social power refers to the ability to impose one's will on others, 
despite resistance (e.g., French & Raven, 1959), whereas social status refers to 
the amount of prestige one possesses along some evaluative dimension (e.g., 
Weber, 1946). Given that achieving positive social identity is the focus of social 
identity theory, it is not surprising that its associated research focuses on social 
status (see, e.g., Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As social dominance theory 
is more concerned with group-based inequality, it has focused on social power. 
Recent research suggests that distinguishing between status and power is 
important because they have different effects, even in minimal-group contexts (for 
a review, see Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Whereas both group power (e.g., Ng, 1982b; 
Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1991) and group status (e.g., Caddick, 1982; Commins 
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& Lockwood, 1979; Mullen et al., 1992; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991; 
Skevington, 1981; Turner, 1978; Turner & Brown, 1978; van Knippenberg, 1984; 
van Knippenberg & van Oers, 1984) both enhance ingroup favoritism, they do so 
in different ways. Most important, whereas tatus may lead to ingroup favoritism, 
the existence of social power makes discrimination possible in the first place (Ng, 
1982b, 1984; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1991). Thus, for example, groups with 
insecure high power show less ingroup favoritism (see Ng, 1982a, 1984), but 
groups with insecure high status show more ingroup favoritism (see Brewer & 
Kramer, 1985). Results such as these suggest that, whereas threats to the status 
of one's group may indeed encourage compensatory ingroup favoritism, ingroup 
favoritism will not be attempted when the group's ability to impose its will on 
others is in doubt. 
In addition, there is evidence that status and power affect different group- 
relevant phenomena. Status differentials explain most of the variance in ingroup 
identification a d intergroup erceptions, whereas power differentials explain 
most of the variance in actual discrimination (Ng, 1984; Sachdev & Bourhis, 
1991). Thus, although considering status differentials does help to explain certain 
patterns of beliefs about groups, a complete understanding of the actual oppres- 
sive behaviors underlying roup-based systems of hierarchy requires examining 
the role of power in intergroup relations, as social dominance theory does. 
Another way in which social dominance theory differs from social identity 
theory and self-categorization theory is that the latter theories are concerned pri- 
marily with shifts in definitions of the self as a member of some generic ingroup 
in relation to some generic outgroup. This implies a theoretical equivalence 
between membership in groups based on different characteristics such as race, 
age, gender, or some minimal-group distinction. Failure to make a theoretical dis- 
tinction between membership in different types of groups equates discrimination 
by whites against blacks, by adults against children, by men against women, and 
by any minimally defined ingroup against a minimally defined outgroup. In con- 
trast, social dominance theory distinguishes among group relations based on 
gender, those based on the adult-child istinction, and those based on the most 
salient groups in a society (such as those based on race, ethnicity, religion, nation- 
ality, or class), which we call the "arbitrary-set" distinction. Although some 
aspects of these three systems are similar (e.g., the existence of stereotyping and 
discrimination for both gender and race), social dominance theory asserts that 
these three forms of group inequality are also qualitatively different. For example, 
gender and adult-child relations generally appear to have a strong paternalistic or 
familial component (see also Jackman, 1994). Whereas arbitrary-set relations can, 
at times, be personal and paternalistic (e.g., involving physical intimacy or 
common households), the level of oppression and violence against arbitrary-set 
groups typically surpasses the level associated with patriarchy or adult-child rela- 
tions, at times becoming quite systematic and extensive. Thus, genocide, espe- 
cially directed at outgroup males, is much more common than either "gynocide" 
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or mass infanticide. Social dominance theory argues that differences among the 
three systems occur because they serve different functions both for individuals 
and society at large. In particular, gender oppression appears to be an attempt by 
males to control the reproductive, sexual, and economic prerogatives of females, 
whereas arbitrary-set hierarchy is primarily an exercise in economic exploitation, 
debilitation, and aggression by ingroup males against outgroup males (see Pratto 
& Walker, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Veniegas, 2000). 
In addition to social dominance theory's emphasis on group differences in 
power and the different systems of group-based hierarchy, the theory can also be 
distinguished from social identity theory in its emphasis on the consensual nature 
of hierarchical intergroup relations. For example, and contrary to the claims of 
Jost et al. (2004), we have formally analyzed the extent o which legitimizing ide- 
ologies are consensually held across the groups that they either privilege or den- 
igrate (Sidanius et al., 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, chapter 4). As summarized 
above, many ideologies do not serve the social or psychological ends of subordi- 
nate groups as well as they do those of dominant groups. Not surprisingly, rela- 
tive to members of dominant groups, members of subordinate groups tend to 
behave in less self-interested or group-interested ways (for a review, see Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999, chapter 9; see also van Laar & Sidanius, 2001). Thus, group-based 
inequality is not only the result of the greater power of and discrimination by 
dominant groups, but is also partly the result of the complementary and cooper- 
ative behaviors of subordinate groups. The notion that exploitative and hierar- 
chically organized relationships between dominant and subordinate groups are, in 
part, the product of active cooperation between these two groups is an assump- 
tion shared with system justification theory (see Jost et al., 2004) and has been a 
part of social dominance theory since its inception (see Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius, 
Levin, & Pratto, 1996; see also Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, chapter 3). Having been 
heavily influenced by neoclassical elitism theorists (see, e.g., Marx & Engels, 
1846/1970; Michels, 1911/1962; Mosca, 1896/1939; Pareto, 1901/1979, 1935/ 
1963), social dominance theory has argued that legitimizing ideologies draw their 
formidable strength from the fact that they function to justify inequitable 
social relationships not only in the minds of dominants, but (perhaps even more 
important) in the minds of subordinates a well. 
One of the key distinctions between social dominance theory and other 
models concerns the issue of "scope." Many theories of intergroup discrimination 
and prejudice born during the "cognitive" revolution of the 1970s, including social 
identity theory and self-categorization theory, view discrimination a d prejudice 
as products of the individual's normal cognitive processes. Although social dom- 
inance theory does not dispute the importance of such psychological processes, it 
is both broader and more socially contextualized. Social dominance theory argues 
that a comprehensive understanding ofthe dynamics of intergroup conflict and 
discrimination requires the integration of processes at several different levels of 
analysis, including the differential behavior of dominant and subordinate groups, 
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the subtly different strategies and goals of men and women, the role of distinctly 
different types of social institutions (e.g., hierarchy-enhancing a d hierarchy- 
attenuating institutions), and the functions of consensually shared legitimizing 
social ideologies. 
Finally, one of the clearest and most fundamental differences between social 
dominance theory and social identity theory, and a difference r lated to the "levels 
of analysis issue," concerns the question of individual differences. As already 
mentioned, social dominance theory is a multilevel approach in which the dynam- 
ics of intergroup relations are explored as a function of situationally contingent 
construals of social identity, societal-level legitimizing ideologies, the net effects 
of social institutions, and individual predispositions to discriminate against gen- 
eralized outgroups. In contrast, social identity theory has put essentially all of its 
theoretical emphasis on situationally contingent social identities and the manner 
in which social groups are represented "in the head." Most important-and com- 
pletely at odds with social dominance theory in its attempt to completely reject 
anything resembling a "personality theory"-social identity theorists also tend to 
reject the notion of relatively stable individual differences or individual predis- 
positions to discriminate against outgroups (see, e.g., Turner & Reynolds, 2003). 
As mentioned by Huddy (2004), this represents a rather extreme example of sit- 
uationism and is a position that is rather difficult to reconcile with the empirical 
data. Even though an individual's response to outgroups is multidetermined and 
also driven by situationally contingent social identities, all else being equal, 
certain individuals are still more likely to discriminate against outgroups than 
others, and people who discriminate against a particular outgroup are also likely 
to discriminate against outgroups in general. 
System Justification Theory 
Social dominance theory was developed just prior to and independently of 
system justification theory (see Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). However, 
the two models share a common theoretical heritage in the work of Marx and 
Engels (1846/1970). Marx and Engels argued that the social, political, moral, and 
aesthetic ideologies of society are widely shared and that these ideologies are 
largely manufactured to serve the political and economic interests of the domi- 
nant class. Because of their control of the means of intellectual production (e.g., 
mass media, universities), the "ruling classes" are able to convince non-elites of 
the moral and intellectual righteousness of social policies, especially allocative 
policies that primarily serve the interests of the owners of the means of produc- 
tion rather than the interests of the workers and lower classes (see similar argu- 
ments by Gramsci, 1971; Mosca, 1896/1939). Contrary to the claims of Jost et al. 
(2004), with certain modifications, both system justification theory and social 
dominance theory have applied this basic idea of "false consciousness" to the 
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general study of ethnic and intergroup relations.7 For example, both system jus- 
tification theory and social dominance theory postulate that race, gender, and class 
stereotypes are not just cognitive simplifications or negative xpectations of other 
groups. Rather, social stereotypes are also consensually shared across group 
boundaries, and they give moral and intellectual legitimacy to the hierarchical 
relations among these groups. In other words, social stereotypes not only serve 
cognitive or ego-defensive functions for individuals and group-validating func- 
tions for advantaged social groups, but also serve to support and justify entire 
systems of hierarchical relationships within the society as a whole. Although 
system justification theorists appear loath to admit it-perhaps out of a desire to 
manufacture positive distinctiveness-social dominance theorists have always 
been in complete agreement with them concerning their central thesis, namely that 
both dominants and subordinates participate in the legitimization of the hierar- 
chical social system. Thus, within social dominance theory, the creation and main- 
tenance of group-based hierarchy is very much a collaborative and cooperative 
enterprise between dominants and subordinates. Although subordinates will often 
not endorse the hierarchy-enhancing a d system-justifying deologies and myths 
with the same degree of enthusiasm as will dominants, this endorsement will often 
still be of sufficient magnitude and breadth as to lend net support to the set of 
hierarchically structured group relations (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, chapter 9). 
If there is any difference between system justification theory and social domi- 
nance theory on this point, it concerns the relative degree to which dominants and 
subordinates endorse hierarchy-enhancing social ideologies: System justification 
theory tends to view subordinate ndorsement of these beliefs to be slightly 
stronger than found among dominants, whereas ocial dominance theory tends to 
posit the reverse pattern. Similarly, both theories imply that hierarchy-enhancing 
ideologies produce a more difficult social-psychological and political situation for 
members of subordinate groups than for members of dominant groups. Specifi- 
cally, people's needs for positive ingroup identification (i.e., "group justification" 
according to Jost & Thompson, 2000) are compatible with support for a hierar- 
chical social system (i.e., "system justification" according to Jost & Thompson, 
2000) if they are in dominant groups. For people in subordinate groups, ingroup 
identification is incompatible with support for the hierarchical social system 
(Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994) and is associated with more 
neuroticism (Jost & Thompson, 2000) and ambivalence about problems con- 
fronted by ingroup members (Jost & Burgess, 2000). These theories neither 
presume that members of subordinate groups simply acquiesce to cultural ide- 
ologies that demean and restrict hem, nor presume that people only adopt and 
are influenced by ideologies that serve their own interests. Rather, both theories 
7 For some important differences between system justification theory and social dominance theory 
with respect to the manner in which this idea of "false consciousness" is applied, see Sidanius et al. 
(2001). 
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distinguish between the social-psychological situation of members of dominant 
and subordinate groups by focusing on the different purposes that ideologies serve 
for members of these groups. This recognition is relatively new for system justi- 
fication theory, and that theory has yet to articulate when people will and will not 
try to justify the social systems in which they live. Indeed, system justification 
theory relies on a universal cognitive bias to explain why people support systems 
that work against their own interests, characterized by acquiescence to "whatever 
is, is right" (Jost, 2001). 
Although system justification theory and social dominance theory really do 
not differ with respect to their views concerning the functioning and dynamics of 
consensual social ideology, they really do differ with respect to two other issues. 
First, whereas system justification theory largely restricts itself to those ideolo- 
gies that justify social hierarchies, ocial dominance theory has argued that social 
systems also contain widely shared ideologies, which serve to delegitimize hier- 
archy and its practices. Social dominance theory has argued that it is the balance 
of these hierarchy-enhancing a d hierarchy-attenuating ideologies that contributes 
to the maintenance of hierarchical stability of a social system over time. 
Second is the issue of "scope" we raised in the previous section. Whereas 
system justification theory largely restricts itself to one general level of analysis 
(i.e., the functioning of legitimizing ideologies), social dominance theory exam- 
ines processes at multiple levels of analysis. Social dominance theory recognizes 
that human societies are complex systems, influenced by humans' evolutionary 
past, people's current reproductive, material, psychological, and social needs, and 
the historical context in which they have been socialized and behave. Further- 
more, social dominance theory argues that group-based oppression is the result of 
the reciprocal influences of institutional, cultural, historical, and structural con- 
ditions on the one hand, and psychological and behavioral predispositions and 
fitness interests of individuals and groups on the other hand. Furthermore, like 
Marx and Engels' classic work (1846/1970) and contemporary feminist Marxist 
theory, social dominance theory also argues that gender relations are not reducible 
to class, race, or other arbitrary-set group distinctions, but have dynamics that are 
uniquely their own, a refinement ot generally appreciated by system justification 
theory or other modern models of intergroup relations.8 
Conclusion 
In comparing social dominance theory with other theories, we emphasize that 
social dominance theory is not an attempt to reject the insights of other important 
models of intergroup relations and discrimination, such as social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986), authoritarian personality theory (Adorno et al., 1950; 
Altemeyer, 1988), realistic group conflict theory (Blumer, 1960; Bobo, 2000; 
' For one exception to this general trend, see Jackman (1994). 
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Campbell, 1965; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000), and the several modern racism theories (see, e.g., Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 1998; Katz & Hass, 1988; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Sears, 1988). 
Such approaches contain too many valuable insights for such wholesale dismissal. 
Rather, social dominance theory is an attempt to integrate the most valid features 
of these other models into a more comprehensive and multileveled understanding 
of the dynamics of group-based social oppression. Whereas alternative models 
largely concentrate on a single level of analysis to the exclusion of others (e.g., 
the psychological, the interpersonal, the situational, the organizational, the struc- 
tural), social dominance theory attempts to examine processes at several evels of 
analysis. Even more important, social dominance theory describes how processes 
at one level of analysis (e.g., individual differences) both affect and are affected 
by processes at other levels of analysis (e.g., institutional), all resulting in the cre- 
ation and recreation of group-based social hierarchy. We suggest that it is only by 
efforts at "conceptual integration" across several different levels of analysis that 
major progress toward understanding the complex nature of prejudice, discrimi- 
nation, and oppression may be achieved. Social dominance theory is one of the 
earliest attempts at such conceptual integration. 
Our more synthetic method of theorizing and our broader theoretical agenda 
have also pointed out some new directions for research on prejudice, discrimina- 
tion, stereotyping, and ideologies. First, our work (like that of others, e.g., Ng, 
1982b, 1984; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1991) resurrects he study of power, and 
not just prestige or status, as a central aspect of intergroup relations and social 
psychology. We suspect that this change in focus leads more naturally to consid- 
erations of inequality and political and material concerns than to the individual- 
istic self and psychological construals of reality. 
Second, our systems approach highlights the importance of shared social 
processes and aggregate social behaviors, such as social discourse, cultural ide- 
ologies, and institutional discrimination, rather than individual cognition and 
adjustment. Discourse analysis (e.g., Potter, Edwards, & Wetherell, 1993) and 
research on the communication of stereotypes have also promoted the importance 
of the shared nature of ideologies in recreating social inequalities, as have par- 
ticular broad-minded anthropological studies of how ideologies reify social rela- 
tions (see Sanday, 1981). Nonetheless, more research and theorizing on the origins 
of ideologies and how they are spread is needed. 
Third, by active consideration of culture and of the shared meaning systems 
and action patterns of societies, social dominance theory has distinguished 
between patterns of relationships that are common and those that differ across 
cultures. Again, however, a more detailed understanding of alternative forms of 
gender, arbitrary-set, and adult-child relations and how these systems intersect is
needed. 
Fourth, social dominance theory suggests that we must pay more attention 
not only to the behavior of institutions inthe creation and maintenance of group- 
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based social hierarchy, but also to the manner in which institutions interact with 
the behavioral predispositions of personnel within these institutions (see van Laar 
et al., 1999). 
Fifth, inspired by feminist and ethnic studies, social dominance research as 
sought to examine the actual situations of people in oppressed or dominant posi- 
tions, rather than assuming that laboratory experiments on peers can fully simu- 
late such conditions. American psychologists' growing but still atypical habit of 
studying people other than white middle-class college students is only part of a 
step toward having researchers articulate the cultural, political, and historical 
context in which they work. 
Sixth, following van den Berghe (1967), social dominance theory has pointed 
out that not all intergroup oppressive or exploitative relationships have the same 
properties, nor are they supported by the same kinds of ideologies. In particular, 
we have found that discrimination against men in subordinate groups takes a dif- 
ferent and often more virulent form than discrimination against women (Jackman, 
1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Veniegas, 2000; Wrangham & 
Peterson, 1996). Although some feminist critics have objected to this distinction, 
we believe that theorizing and examining the meaning of gender for both men and 
women, and pointing out variance among men as well as among women, is well 
in keeping with the feminist research agenda. 
Finally, we agree with some of our critics (see Huddy, 2004) concerning one 
important limitation of social dominance theory. This limitation concerns the 
issues of social change and the obvious facts that the degree of intergroup hier- 
archy within a given society changes over time and that different societies display 
substantially different levels of group-based hierarchy, even stretching over rela- 
tively long periods of historical time (e.g., the differences in sexism between 
Scandinavia and Afghanistan). The fact that social dominance theory does not 
have well-developed mechanisms for dealing with intra- and intersocietal differ- 
ences in the degree of group-based hierarchy (i.e., social change) was first pointed 
out by social dominance theorists themselves (e.g., Sidanius, 1993, pp. 217-218). 
However, this admitted shortcoming does not put social dominance theory at any 
particular competitive disadvantage because none of the other major models of 
intergroup relations contain well-theorized mechanisms of social change. Even 
more important, this accusation of being "theoretically static" is actually beside 
the point. Even though there are temporal and intersocietal differences in the 
"degree" of group-based social hierarchy, the sad fact of the matter is that all 
known surplus-producing social systems9 are, in fact, organized as group-based 
social hierarchies. There are no known exceptions. As already mentioned, the 
basic goal of social dominance theory is to identify and understand the multi- 
leveled mechanisms responsible for this ubiquitous form of social organization 
By the term "surplus-producing social systems" we refer to societies that produce stable economic 
surplus, in contrast o the situation for most hunter-gatherer societies. 
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and how these mechanisms express themselves in the form of intergroup bias, 
discrimination, and intergroup oppression. 
Social dominance theory has been greeted with substantial skepticism in 
some circles. From what we can tell, much of this skepticism is due to funda- 
mental misconstruals and misapprehensions of what social dominance theory is 
actually about. We hope that the present paper will help dispel these mispercep- 
tions. We have tried to show that social dominance theory has benefited from 
several research traditions and has sought to build on some of their important find- 
ings and perspectives. Moreover, we have attempted to show how the methods 
and theoretical agenda of social dominance theory are quite compatible with some 
of the most intellectually and politically progressive movements in the social sci- 
ences today. 
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